Libya’s African Problem

As the report by Al Jazeera English, above, indicates, being black in Libya, always a precarious existence, have become even more dangerous since the revolt against Muammar Gaddafi’s regime commenced. I asked my former PhD advisor, David Styan–who writes on politics in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa and who is based at Birkbeck College’s School of Politics and Sociology in London–to unpack for AIAC some aspects of the revolt in Libya.  David sent back answers, not just on the media’s reporting of Gaddafi’s use of “African/black mercenaries,”* but also the Libyan’s regime’s political legacy in the continent, especially in the Sahel and West Africa, and Libya’s role in European immigration politics.

 

How should we decipher the outcry over ‘Black Africans’ in the Libyan crisis?

Media views of the ‘African’ dimension of Libya’s crisis are contradictory and fluid. The political crisis has prompted most of Libya’s estimated 1.5m migrants to try and flee. Labourers from neighbouring Egypt and Tunisia flocked to land-borders. European oil personnel, plus Chinese, Turkish and Asian workers have been evacuated by their governments. Yet many Africans migrants remain trapped in extremely dangerous and uncertain conditions.

As the clip above highlights, Sub-Saharan Africans face several acute problems. First and foremost there is a widespread local perception that forces loyal to Qadaffi comprise ‘Black’ – implying non-Libyan – Africans. While this perception has been the catalyst for violence, it is fanned by deeper-seated discrimination. The contradictions surrounding this, and Qadaffi’s diplomacy towards the continent, have prompted debate over representations of Libya this week (see in the introduction to this post).

The livelihoods of sub-Saharan Africans in Libya are precarious; most having neither assets nor legal status in the country. Some arrived initially in the hope of transiting to Europe. Effectively trapped by poverty and EU-Libya migration accords, many tens of thousands, primarily from West Africa have nevertheless scraped a living as labourers and petty-traders in Libya’s post-sanctions oil-boom. Other recent arrivals, particularly from the Horn of Africa, have faced a bleaker outlook, incarcerated in camps or repatriated, notably to Eritrea.

What lies behind the ‘black mercenaries’ story?

There is a gulf between perceptions and reality; initially both European and Arab journalists echoed what Libyans told them, that Qadaffi’s forces comprised only ‘foreign’ and ‘black’ troops. This perception rested on a double-amalgam: firstly that anyone supporting Qadaffi is a ‘foreign mercenary’; secondly that these mercenaries were drawn principally from sub-Saharan Africa.

To date, there is little evidence that either is true. Initial fighting in Benghazi produced images of a single mutilated corpse of an ‘African’.  Yet Libya’s own population is racially variegated, with ‘black’ populations straddling Libya’s vast Sahelian borders with Niger and Chad. Qadaffi’s power has rested in part on patronage and clan allegiances, which are particularly pronounced within his diverse security forces.

Qadaffi has contorted political ties with southern neighbours; disillusioned with the failures of Pan-Arabism, since the late-nineties he reoriented diplomacy towards the continent, investing heavily in his Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the African Union. Financial and political support brought many African leaders, rebels and militias to Tripoli, both from the Sahel and further afield.

More specific are Libya ties with Chad. In addition to the border war of the 1980s, Qadaffi has been a key player in successive Chadian civil wars. In 2008, alongside France, he supplied arms to prevent the overthrow of Chad’s President Déby and is the key power broker between both Déby and his opponents, as well as in the fractious Chad-Sudan rivalry over Darfur. Diverse Chadian militia are present in Tripoli and Sirte and Chadian websites in Europe, which are far from reliable, claim they have evidence that Chadian forces and commanders are helping defend Qadaffi.

Did Libya welcome sub-Saharan migrants?

Hardly, some Sahelian groups from Chad and Niger have long had a presence in Libya. Yet while cash-handouts via CEN-SAD has boosted the number of African diplomats in Tripoli, the influx of migrant workers  has more to do with shifting migration patterns from West Africa overland via Niger. Since 2007 the EU moved, with some success, to halt illegal migration via Morocco and the Canaries. Migrant trafficking from the Libyan coast to Malta and Southern Italy then increased.

This route has particularly drawn migrants from the Horn of Africa, notably Eritreans and Somalis (ironically, like Libya, both former Italian colonies) funnelled through Sudan, via the southeasten Libya oasis town of Kufra, to the coast.  US-based Human Rights Watch has provided extensive research and documentation of the plight of these migrants over the past five years.  First Italy, thence the EU has worked increasingly closely with Libya in recent years to monitor and control these migrant flows.

So Qadaffi’s Libya has been a key partner in the European Union’s migration controls?

Yes, while ample publicity has been given to the way in which Britain, France and Italy rushed to sign oil, defence and construction contracts with Libya, less attention has been paid to the migration dimension of Qadaffi’s rehabilitation. Particularly for Paris and Rome, where governments face acute electoral pressure over race and migration, getting Libya to control migrant flows has been important. In 2008 Italy signed a bi-lateral deal, and in 2010, the EU agreed to a Euro50m package whereby Libya would “manage  migration” and process refugee for the EU [N4].  This was hugely controversial and prompted significant and ongoing protests. (See here and here).   The EU’s ad-hoc border force ‘Frontex’ was mobilised after the Tunisian government fell, and an EU summit has been called on Migration on 11 March.

* For those further interested the subject of “black mercenaries” have also been covered in detailed blog posts elsewhere; like that by Konwomyn, Tomathon.com and on Pambazuka News, to name a few.

How Qaddafi Reshaped Africa

MAR 1 2011, 7:00 AM ET6

The Libyan leader's dark legacy already includes some of the continent's worst regimes and conflicts 

Whenever most of us think of oil-rich, Arab-speaking countries, our imagination performs a trick with our sense of geography, placing us by default in the Middle East.

Of the three North African countries at the heart of the popular uprisings that have riveted the world over the last several weeks, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi has always done the most to assert his country's African identity, staking its prestige, its riches and his own personal influence above all on its place in the continent.

As a deep-pocketed and sparsely populated state ever in need of labor, it has always made sense for Qaddafi to look south. Libya is far too small and peripheral for it to ever aspire to real influence in the Arab world. By comparison, the almost equally small but far poorer countries of nearby West Africa, wracked as they are with chronic misrule and instability, loom temptingly on the horizon as fruit ripe for picking.

Whatever our loose or flawed sense of geography tells us, things have always been thus. For at least 1,000 years, Morocco's kingdoms have periodically thrust southward, establishing shape-shifting realms from present-day Niger all the way to Senegal. 

Qaddafi's big idea was to meld a modern, anti-Western, anti-imperial discourse with an impassioned pan-Africanism, an ideal that still resonates deeply across the continent. 

For decades in Africa, Qaddafi has put his money where his mouth was: showering petro-dollars on favored clients, funding liberation groups, nurturing political movements, and even paying civil servants. To make sure that no one missed the message, he has often paid a huge portion of the operating costs of the continental body, the African Union.

The problem with Qaddafi's pan-Africanism, like his rule in general is that it has steadily turned into a vessel for his megalomania.

As a reporter with a career-long association with the African continent, I have been in a rare position to witness this trend beginning with some of Qaddafi's earliest African exploits.

In 1983, I scrambled from Ivory Coast to Chad to witness the breakout of war between French and Libyan forces there. Qaddafi had recently spoken of fully "integrating" his country with its southern neighbor. 

I quickly found my way to the eastern front, where I watched the conflict from a desert foxhole with French soldiers as they spotted screaming, low-flying Jaguar fighter bombers pounding Libyan positions nearby. That same year, I traveled to Burkina Faso, where Qaddafi had flown to celebrate the seizure of power by a charismatic young army captain, Thomas Sankara, who he clearly saw as a promising understudy. 

They met at a military base near the border with Ghana. From there, Sankara's comrade, Blaise Compaoré had recently rallied paratroopers to free Sankara from detention and install him as president. 

When I showed up, Qaddafi, surrounded by his famous all female bodyguard corps, angrily objected to my presence and demanded that Sankara not allow an American to ride with the motorcade for their triumphal, flag-waving trip to the capital, Ouagadougou. Sankara, who already knew me well, insisted on my presence. Four years later, he would be dead, murdered by Compaoré, it is widely believed, with Qaddafi's encouragement.

The Libyan's determination to eliminate his erstwhile protégé had nothing to do with me, of course. Most signs point instead to Sankara's refusal to acquiesce in a much bigger decision: to sponsor an invasion of Liberia by Charles Taylor, a leader who is now before the Hague on war crime charges related to his instigation of what would go on to become one of Africa's most horrific conflicts.

Taylor, a kindred megalomaniac, who was trained and financed by Libya, invaded Liberia in 1989. A few years later, I would cover that war for The New York Times as well, watching the rebel leader ride one of the first mass deployments of child soldiers into power. 

Were it not for the British intervention in Sierra Leone's civil war next door, another Libyan project, the Taylor-Qaddafi axis would have taken over that country next, before turning its sights on other wobbling dominos nearby, whether Guinea or Ivory Coast. From Liberia, I went to Zaire to cover the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko at the hands of Laurent Kabila, an obscure revolutionary who had cut his teeth in 1960 liberation movements before seemingly going into hibernation. Although Rwanda was his main patron, it turns out that Qaddafi had invested in Kabila, too.

A map of the places where I watched Qaddafi play similar games would stretch from Seychelles to the Central African Republic to Guinea, far vaster even than the Moroccan domains of old.

Even today, when one looks around the continent at zones of conflict, it's a safe bet that the Libyan leader has a line in, ever willing to take long odds that eventually his strategy of cobbling together a pan-African realm will pan out. 

As such dreams crumble along with his power, however, Qaddafi will leave a final destabilizing legacy for the continent. Among the million-plus sub-Saharan migrants living in his country, many have already faced suspicion and brutal reprisals because of Qaddafi's use of black mercenaries as a desperate, final rampart. 

But there is worse still. It is all but certain that there are new Charles Taylors out there, trained and armed by Qaddafi and eager to mount violent bids for power. And with their patron going down in flames, they will be heading home.

Image by Alex Hoyt

>via: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/qaddafis-deep-reach-...