Libyans gather around the wreckage of a US F-15 fighter jet in Ghot Sultan, South-East of Benghazi on March 22, 2011 after crashing while on a mission against Moamer Kadhafi's air defences. The US Africa Command said the aircraft had experienced equipment malfunction over northeast Libya, adding that the two crew members had ejected and were safe.
Libyans inspect the wreckage of a US F15 fighter jet after it crashed in an open field in the village of Bu Mariem, east of
Benghazi, eastern
Libya, Tuesday, March 22, 2011, with both crew ejecting safely. The U.S.
Africa Command said both crew members were safe after what was believed to be a mechanical failure of the
Air Force F-15. The aircraft, based out of Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, was flying out of Italy's Aviano Air Base in
support of Operation Odyssey Dawn.
Libyans inspect the wreckage of a US F15 fighter jet after it crashed in an open field in the village of Bu Mariem, east of
Benghazi, eastern
Libya, Tuesday, March 22, 2011, with both crew ejecting safely. The U.S.
Africa Command said both crew members were safe after what was believed to be a mechanical failure of the Air Force F-15. The aircraft, based out of Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, was flying out of Italy's Aviano Air Base in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn.
A Qatar Air Force fighter jets on the ground next of a
Cyprus airways
Airbus A330 aircraft at Larnaca
international airport, Cyprus, Tuesday, March 22, 2011. Two Qatar Air Force fighter jets and a cargo aircraft were heading to
Crete Tuesday in the first sign of
military operations by Qatar so far to help enforce a no-fly zone over
Libya, officials said. The planes made an unscheduled stop at the island's Larnaca airport, and government spokesman Stefanos Stefanou said in a statement that the two Mirage jets and one cargo aircraft would
depart after refueling.
A British Eurofighter EF-2000 Typhoon takes off from Gioia del Colle
NATOairbase in southern Italy March 22, 2011. NATO tried again on Tuesday to resolve a fractious debate on who should command the military campaign against
Muammar Gaddafi's forces in
Libya once the United States steps back from leading the operation.
Missiles are seen inside the Gioia del Colle
NATO airbase in southern Italy March 22, 2011. Italy repeated its demand on Tuesday that military operations against
Libya be placed under a joint NATO command, underlining the growing differences in the anti-Gaddafi coalition.
A British Royal Air Force (RAF) Tornado GR4 takes off from RAF Marham, in eastern England March 22, 2011. Only one in three Britons agree with the decision to take military action in
Libya, a poll published Monday showed.
Libyan rebels retreat as mortars from
Moammar Gadhafi's forces are fired on them
on the frontline of the outskirts of the city of Ajdabiya, south of
Benghazi, eastern
Libya, Tuesday, March 22, 2011. Coalition forces bombarded Libya for a third straight night, targeting the air defenses and forces of Libyan ruler Moammar Gadhafi, stopping his advances and handing some momentum back to the rebels, who were on the verge of defeat just last week.
Destroyed army vehicles are pictured at the Boussetta Libyan navy base on March 22, 2011, the day after it was bombarded some 10 kilometres (six miles) east of Tripoli center.
People
stand in front of the wreckage of the Boussetta Libyan navy base on March 22, 2011, the day after it was bombarded some 10 kilometres (six miles) east of Tripoli center.
A Libyan soldier checks vehicles damaged by coalition air strikes at a naval military facility in eastern
Tripoli, March 22, 2011. Anti-aircraft fire and explosions reverberated across Tripoli for a third night on Monday and state television said several sites had come under attack in the capital. A U.S. general said, however, that attacks on
Libya -- launched in a U.N. mandated operation to stop attacks on civilians by
Muammar Gaddafi's forces -- were likely to slow in the coming days.
A man holds a picture of Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi as he stands in the wreckage of the Boussetta Libyan navy base on March 22, 2011, the day after it was bombarded some 10 kilometres (six miles) east of Tripoli center.
A Libyan naval officer flashes a victory sign at a naval military facility damaged by coalition forces air strikes last night in People's Port in eastern Tripoli March 22, 2011. Anti-aircraft fire and explosions reverberated across Tripoli for a third night on Monday and state television said several sites had come under attack in the capital.
A boy looks out as mourners pray during the funeral of a rebel killed by forces loyal to Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi in Ajdabiyah, in
Benghazi March 22, 2011.
Mourners gather around the body of a rebel killed by forces loyal to Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi in Ajdabiyah, during his funeral in
Benghazi, March 22, 2011.
Curious Libyan onlookers take pictures of dead African teenagers, members of Moamer Kadhafi forces on March 20, 2011 in al-Wayfiyah, 35 km West of Benghazi hit by French warplanes.
Boys hold toy guns during a protest by supporters of
Libya's leader
Muammar Gaddafi at Green Square in
Tripoli March 21, 2011.
A Libyan man reacts after identifying his killed brother in the morgue of the Jalaa hospital in
Benghazi, eastern
Libya, Tuesday, March 22, 2011. His brother was killed earlier in fighting around the city of Ajdabiya, where rebels clash now for weeks with troops of
Moammar Gadhafi.
Libyan rebels gather on a hill on March 22, 2011 as they massed for a second day on several kilometres from the key city of Ajdabiya to try to attack government forces that have encircled the town.
Libyan rebels duck for cover as they come under tank fire from Moamer Kadhafi's forces on the outskirts of Ajdabiya on March 22, 2011 as rag-tag rebel forces massed for a second day to try to attack government forces that have encircled the town.
Lybian rebels deploy for a second day on several kilometres from the key city of Ajdabiya to try to attack government forces that have encircled the town on March 22, 2011.
Lybian rebels unload rocket propelled grenades from a car on March 22, 2011 as they massed for a second day on several kilometres from the key city of Ajdabiya to try to attack government forces that have encircled the town.

I believe most Americans support military actions that protect the vital interests of the United States. Major American military initiatives, however, especially those involving the military invasion of a Muslim country in the era of the global jihad, have consequences and should only be taken because our vital strategic interests are at stake.
Thus far, no vital American strategic interests regarding Libya have been stated. Rather, official government policy appears to be designed to get rid of Gaddafi because he’s a tyrant, and to protect Libyan citizens on humanitarian grounds.
Our policymakers seem to believe that once this mission is accomplished some benign coalition of pro-democratic leaders will arise and take command, and all will be well.
There seems to be a huge general assumption that anti-Gaddafi forces are pro-American forces that should be armed and organized by the United States, but as you will see below there is documentary proof that at least some of the anti-Gaddafi forces are anti-American and pro-jihadist.
Even more disturbing: I have heard nothing from any policymaker, either political or military, that indicates that any of them have the slightest idea of the nature or make-up of Libya’s tribal society and how this will impact our ability to establish post-Gaddafi governance.
According to Libya expert Hanspeter Mattes of the Institute of Middle East Studies at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Libya is the most tribal of all the Arab states.
The country has not had a constitution since 1977, and there are virtually no democratic civil institutions — such as trade unions or PTAs — in the country, making the 140 tribes, clans, and powerful families key elements of society.
About 30 of these tribal entities have significant political power. Some, like the Maqarha and the Warfalla tribes, are in alliance with the Gaddafi tribe and have dominated the army, police, and intelligence services since Gaddafi took power. Others, such as the Zuwaya, control the key cities in the Gulf of Surt — where oil is exported.
While knowledge of the political power and connections of tribes is a must for any policymaker planning on transforming the country, this isn’t the only knowledge required.
Tribes are notorious for doing only what’s in their interests, which means that they often change sides. This is why the Iraqi tribes in al-Anbar province went from fighting American forces alongside al-Qaeda to joining American forces to kill their Muslim al-Qaeda brothers.
They made this dramatic shift because the U.S. could better serve the tribes’ interests by providing money and services — such as civil projects and government jobs — that al-Qaeda couldn’t deliver.
Another aspect of tribal society that is vital for policymakers to understand are the tribal concepts of honor, humiliation, and revenge. Tribes seek revenge against all who have dishonored them, and an understanding of these dynamics can mean the difference between success and failure when attempting to build tribal coalitions to govern the country.
The importance of tribes and the lack of democratic civil institutions in Libya should have been a huge red flag to any policymaker contemplating an intervention there, especially given the fact that the U.S. has a dismal record of understanding and dealing with tribes. It took our military leaders four years of trial and error in Iraq before they realized that dealing with the tribes of Anbar could give us the leverage we needed against al-Qaeda. Moreover, after more than eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, we still haven’t figured out how to deal with the tribes there. This lack of grounded truth and strategic thinking didn’t work in Iraq, isn’t working in Afghanistan, and won’t work in Libya.
Some of the questions our policymakers should have answered definitively before any serious military attack was contemplated:
Who are the protesters?
What do they want?
How are they organized?
How do they view the U.S.?
Are they likely to work with the U.S. in the region after Gaddafi, or might they side with Iran?
To what extent are they Islamist and have sympathies for the international jihad?
While some of these questions will take time to know, the answer to the last question is completely known, and disturbing.
Our first erroneous assumption is to think that the protesters against Gaddafi are democrats who want to establish an American-style representative democracy. There is a monumental difference between a local popular uprising against a tyrannical ruler and a movement organized to create Western democratic institutions, especially when the country is a Muslim tribal society and none of these institutions exist.
In this regard, the geographical headquarters of the revolt — located in Eastern Libya in the major cities of Benghazi and Derna — provides a clue as to who these folks are.
On February 25, 2011, Gaddafi blamed al-Qaeda for the revolt, and because Gaddafi is so self-serving, mercurial, and erratic, the mainstream media seems to have automatically discounted any possibility of Islamist involvement.
On February 15, 2008, however, long before anyone ever considered the possibility of a popular uprising against Gaddafi, the U.S. embassy in Tripoli sent a secret cable to Washington titled “Extremism in Eastern Libya” which revealed that this area is rife with anti-American, pro-jihad sentiment.
The cable describes a conversation between embassy officers and a dual U.S./Libyan citizen who provided the embassy with first-hand information about Islamist extremism gleaned from his family and friends in Eastern Libya.
According to the cable, the most troubling aspect of the report:
… is the pride that many eastern Libyans, particularly those in and around Derna, appear to take in the role their native sons have played in the insurgency in Iraq … [and the] ability of radical imams to propagate messages urging support for and participation in jihad.
Answering why this area is so radicalized, the embassy reported:
[The source] partly attributed the fierce mindset in Benghazi and Derna to the message preached by imams in eastern Libyan mosques, which he said is markedly more radical than that heard in other parts of the country. Sermons in eastern mosques, particularly the Friday “khutba,” are laced with “coded phrases” urging worshippers to support jihad in Iraq and elsewhere through direct participation or financial contributions. The language is often … incendiary and unambiguously supportive of jihad. Direct and indirect references to “martyrdom operations” were not uncommon.
The embassy’s alarming report is corroborated by captured al-Qaeda personnel documents — called theSinjar Records — that came into American hands in 2007 and were analyzed by the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.
The Sinjar Records revealed the country of origin of the foreign fighters who came to Iraq to kill American soldiers. While the majority of foreign fighters came from Saudi Arabia, the report also stated:
Libya was the next most common country of origin, with 18.8% (112) of the fighters listing their nationality stating they hailed from Libya. … Furthermore, Libya contributed far more fighters per capita than any other nationality in the Sinjar Records, including Saudi Arabia … the most common cities that the fighters called home were Darnah, Libya and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, with 52 and 51 fighters respectively. Darnah, with a population just over 80,000 compared to Riyadh’s 4.3 million, has far and away the largest per capita number of fighters in the Sinjar records. The next most common hometowns — in real terms — listed in the Sinjar records were Mecca (43), Benghazi (21).”
While it is not correct to say that al-Qaeda created and controls the uprising, it is true that al-Qaeda supports the uprising and will do whatever it can to take advantage of the vacuum resulting from the fall of Gaddafi, especially among the Islamist pro-jihad population of Eastern Libya.
At a minimum, our attack of Libya will be grist for al-Qaeda’s information war and will result in increased recruitment and funding.
Demonstrating al-Qaeda’s support, on March 12 Libyan al-Qaeda Commander Abu Yahya al Libi — who is originally from Benghazi — appeared in an al-Qaeda video in which he praised the uprising:
O proud people and loyal tribes: move forth taking the help of your Lord, with determined goal, renewing your promise, seeking your aim without hesitation or fear, and throw al-Gaddafi into the dump of humiliation.
The documentary information cited above is not opinion or speculation; it is fact and evidence. With the apparent absence of any plan for post-Gaddafi governance, an ignorance of Libya’s tribal nature and our poor record of dealing with tribes, American government documents that conclusively establish that the epicenter of the revolt is rife with anti-American and pro-jihad sentiment, and with al-Qaeda’s explicit support for the revolt, it is appropriate to ask our policymakers how American military intervention in support of this revolt in any way serves vital U.S. strategic interests.
Brian Fairchild served as a career Operations Officer in the Central Intelligence Agency's Clandestine Service with twenty years of experience operating under official and non-official cover. In 1998, he testified before Congress on counterterrorism issues, and he is currently the Director of Intelligence Operations for the Intrepid Group. Since 9/11, he has taught over ten thousand law enforcement officers, intelligence officials, and military personnel about the Muslim Brotherhood and the global Jihad movement. The Intrepid Group provides video tutorials on these subjects on its websiteand YouTube channel.
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Picture of the Day: The Beginning of U.S. Intervention in Libya, 1801
MAR 22 2011, 11:44 AM ET

The history of U.S./Libya intervention began in the late 1700s, when North African states, including Tripoli, demanded tribute to allow safe Mediterranean passage of U.S. vessels. Above, U.S. Navy Capt. William Bainbridge pays tribute to the Dey of Algiers in 1800. He was treated
quite rudely.
Tired of paying tribute to the Barbary states, President Thomas Jefferson sent a squadron of U.S. frigates to the Mediterranean. The first battle between the U.S. and present-day Libya occurred on August 1, 1801, when the USS Enterprise defeated the Tripolitan corsair Tripoli, shown below.
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We again find ourselves at war with a Middle Eastern dictator. How did it get here? Last month, the Libyan people rebelled against their 42-year oppressor, Col. Muammar Gaddafi. The rebels liberated most of their country and were on the verge of overthrowing their tyrant; all that was needed was a bit of air support for the final push into the capital Tripoli. But we waited more than a month for France, Britain, the UN, and the Arab League to lead. In that time, Gaddafi used his air force to crush the uprising, reclaim the liberated territory, and encircle the rebels in the city of Benghazi.
So in the eleventh hour we have decided to bomb Libya.
What is the mission? What are our objectives? The public is in the dark. Barely anyone has mentioned how Congress hasn’t debated or authorized any of this. Secretary of State Clinton is reportedly furious with the administration’s dithering. Vice President Biden, the purported foreign policy expert, is missing in action. And President Obama is away touring South America. The whole scene is very strange and a bit surreal. We have stumbled into war and it feels as though the intervention is both belated and haphazardly rushed at the same time. I can’t recall anything quite like this.
There is no doubt Muammar Gaddafi should go. He has for decades killed Americans and brutalized millions. His regime has 1) repeatedly been aggressive against neighbors; 2) sheltered internationally wanted terrorists; 3) violated non-proliferation treaties and pursued illicit unconventional weapons; 4) committed gross human rights violations on a massive scale — the four reasons, according to international law, that a state forfeits its sovereignty. Gaddafi’s downfall would be a deliverance.
Furthermore, the issue is not so much about justifying our present actions by citing Gaddafi’s past actions, but rather acknowledging the fact that, should Gaddafi survive this confrontation with the West, he will emerge an international outlaw as emboldened as ever. Libya will become chief global pariah — the North Korea of North Africa.
But overthrowing Gaddafi does not seem to be the objective. It’s unclear. At the beginning of the month, weeks before our intervention, President Obama declared Gaddafi must step down. Now that we have intervened, Obama has said, “We are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal — specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya.” Well, protection from whom? Gaddafi, of course. The war strategy seems an inherent contradiction.
Hours after bombing Gaddafi’s compound the Pentagon released a statement saying we didn’t really mean it. “At this particular point, I can guarantee that he’s not on a targeting list,” Vice Admiral Bill Gortney said of Gaddafi. So we’re not going to kill Gaddafi? Gortney’s response: “If he happens to be in a place — if he’s inspecting a surface-to-air missile site, [and] we don’t have any idea that he’s there or not — then, yeah.” Secretary of Defense Gates has called the idea of targeting Gaddafi “unwise.” Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said the war is “not about seeing [Gaddafi go]” but “about supporting the United Nations resolution which talked about eliminating his ability to kill his own people.” This comes weeks after the national intelligence director predicted Gaddafi’s victory over the rebels.
So we are going after Gaddafi’s residences but not Gaddafi himself. This whole thing is bizarre.
Note to the administration: less spokesmen, more clarity. President Obama needs to come back from South America and address the nation. He needs to explain to the country why it is we are attacking Libya, what our objectives are, and all the rest of it. The administration seems understandably concerned about the possibility of a prolonged, protracted war. But one does not avoid such an outcome by ignoring it. Such a possibility is all the more reason to be articulate and clear about what the mission is. Therefore, once the servicemen of the U.S. military accomplish it — which they will — we can be assured that we achieved what we set out to do.
President Obama has said there will be no U.S. ground troops in the operation, the cost of whichtopped $100 million after the first day. Should Obama seek to assuage the worries of a cash-stripped, war-weary American public, he merely needs to say that there will be no U.S. occupation of Libya; no decade-long nation-building effort. But such an announcement would not preclude the aim of overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi. Now that we’re in it, we ought to stay in it until Gaddafi is removed from power. We should watch the chips fall where they may and do business with whoever assumes control of the government. We ought to avoid mission-creep.
George W. Bush spent more than a year trying to justify the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Congress authorized the Iraq mission and listed 23 justifications for doing so. With Libya, everything’s much murkier. We have seen President Obama, cool and detached, “vote present” before. There was the BP oil spill (“I can’t suck it up with a straw”). There were the democratic uprisings in Iran (he wascooking with Bobby Flay). Will objective minds soon contrast Obama’s handling of the recent Japanese tsunami with Bush’s handling of the 2004 South Asian tsunami?
We’ve seen President Obama prioritize NCAA brackets over the budget, high-speed Internet over the debt, beer summits over entitlement reform, health insurance over unemployment, and golf over nearly everything. Even on issues where Obama adopts the position of his critics — Afghanistan, for instance — one never gets the feeling his heart is in it. He rarely addresses the nation about Afghanistan; he doesn’t seem to have a passionate opinion on the matter.
And so this seems the case with Libya, as well. Our ambivalent leadership has gotten the nation into another war. Should Gaddafi cling to power, Libya will rejoin the ranks of Iran, Syria, and North Korea — the most hostile states in the world.
N. M. Guariglia writes on foreign policy. He can be contacted at nmguar@gmail.com.
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